brated for this radical historicist approach, although in this context his strong religious faith is usually ignored, along with his acknowledged affinity for more "empathic" forms of understanding. Efforts to see Collingwood as a "transcendental historicist," inspired by Christianity, are not only on the margins of Collingwood criticism, but they have not always addressed some of his problematic (more radical) later work which seems at odds with his more "idealist" thinking.12 Attempts to interpret Collingwood's work have, in response, either highlighted his inconsistencies, his "confusions and contradictions," bizarrely blamed his skepticism on a series of strokes, posited a "radical conversion" to historicism in his career, plotted dialectical movements to explain the shifts, or simply repressed aspects of his thought in order to give it some coherence and practical value.'3 And while Collingwood's Christianity is now recognized as an important aspect of his thought, it is seen as essentially a philosophical problem that the critic must strive to integrate, successfully or not, into his larger context of ideas. 14 There is no one satisfactory synthesis of Collingwood's work, in part because of the inner tensions in his philosophical and historical thinking. More recently, it has been suggested "we have to accept, rather than explain away, inconsistencies, and that Collingwood was a historicist who could never work out a coherent position in relation to relativism.""15 This is one reason why Collingwood, while an acknowledged hero in the philosophy of history, has become somewhat of a museum piece in that field, having never really found a home in a tradition with contemporary relevance. Critics are now exploring more the archeology of Collingwood's ideas; a recent "reassessment" of him, for example, included two articles discussing his alleged authorship of an early minor text.'6 Certainly, his profound contributions to narrative analysis, his sophisticated historicist position, his "deconstruction" of historical practice, and his original ideas on the intimate link between "evidence" and questions, put him at the forefront of that twentieth-century intellectual move away from questions about the meaning of history, to studies on how historians create meaning, how the past is actually put together within concrete historical circumstances. ' no matter what context, even the context of Collingwood's own thought, is problematic, a constant source of irritation to his commentators.22 Joseph Margolis identifies the "unfathomed mystery" and "unacceptable extravagance" of Collingwood and re-enactment theory as one reason why he is a thinker so difficult to apply or even classify.23 Collingwood's posthumous rehabilitation has often required a domestication of the re-enactment doctrine (whose central position in The Idea of History cannot be safely ignored) in order to defend it against accusations that it is naive, inconsistent, irrational, even mystical, and thus not philosophically serious.
This defensive position was a reaction to some early critiques of The Idea of History.24 Some philosophers simply could not understand Collingwood's conviction that historical understanding is "a situation in which one mind is directly aware of another," where past thoughts are precisely revived in the present.25 If Collingwood was saying that thought "stands outside of time" and endures until "revived," then, as Patrick Gardiner wrote, "the suggestion of some sort of telepathic communication with past thoughts is too insistent to be entirely disregarded."26 Collingwood seemed to be advocating not just a resurrection of the past but a kind of "communion with its reality."27 The theory of re-enactment, where the historian is the "host" for revived thought, was dismissed as "indulgence in clairvoyance" and "mysticism," since this "exquisite symbiosis" between the historian and the past could only be achieved by going into some kind of trance.28 As Ayer would later write, "that the historian should literally incarnate a multitude of persons seems to me incredible."29 Sympathetic critics have constantly defended Collingwood's theory from these kind of attacks. As Leon J. Goldstein loudly proclaimed: "How these direct, immediate, non-thinking forms of mental communication have been foisted upon a writer so unambiguously committed to thinking must be one of the most remarkable intellectual accomplishments of our time."30 Critics have safely reinterpreted So it is no surprise that Collingwood addressed these issues. In a 1923 panel on mysticism and "new idealism," for example, Collingwood, responding to Underhill's critique of the Italian philosophers, admitted: "The necessity of the mystical experience lies in the principle that we discover new truths by an act of the mind which reaches out beyond the given, grasps the new thought as it were in the dark, and only after that consolidates its new conquest. ."2 For Collingwood, mystic insight into the unity of the "whole" was immediate and unreasoned, but laid the foundation for any subsequent rational analysis. This whole was logically prior to the "parts," even though it was essentially invisible and could never be completely known.43 Thought was something rather elusive, skirting the boundaries separating empirical reality, the individual mind, and the secret unity of the universe. In 1928, the same year as his essay "Faith and Reason," Collingwood was elaborating his first version of the re-enactment doctrine in a manuscript entitled "Outlines of a Philosophy of History." Here Collingwood would make the rather strange claim that "thoughts are not private property," while introducing his idea that the historian's thought is not a "copy" of past thinking, but actually contained the past thought itself, as it is repeated, re-thought, in the present.44 While Collingwood would refine these ideas in his lectures on history over the next decade, he would continue to probe the more unusual dimensions of thought, and was himself quite open to more "psychic" forms of understanding. In his manuscripts on metaphysics and cosmology from the early 1930s, for example, he described the intersubjective world as essentially dialogical,45 "penetrated throughout by internal relations," and even discussed the possibility of communicating with what he called other-worldly minds, other embodiments of spirit, although here he felt that the differences between these alien forms of thought and our own mental world were too great: "this seems to rule out clairvoyant experience of them," he admitted, but went on to say: "although I am quite willing to admit clairvoyant experience of the past, the spatially remote, and the future in our own world. It must appear in a context, yet it is never wholly identified with that context, which is only ever a temporary host for what is essentially a non-temporal act. The implication is that at one level at least, thought is never wholly "original."52 For Collingwood, thought of this kind follows an itinerary that veers in and out of "history." The identity of historically constituted thoughts is not, then, a logical one, established by abstracting shared characteristics from essentially independent events. Thought is more than a mere event or situation: repeatability is in its very structure. It is no wonder, then, that the individual mind, though a necessary home for thought, cannot be considered the foundational ground of history. The thought "itself" traverses history. At this point in his argument Collingwood admits that these are "vague phrases," but he also writes that they describe something very "real," "namely the way in which thought, transcending its own immediacy, survives and revives in other contexts; and to express the truth that individual acts and persons appear in history not in virtue of their individuality as such [my italics], but because that individuality is a vehicle of a thought which, because it was actually theirs, is potentially everyone's" (IH 303). The historian obviously cannot be a mere observer of this kind of thought; he can only repeat it once he is prepared to receive it, once he is "pre-adapted to become its host." The re-enactment of the past (the 52. Collingwood believed that ideas and artistic creations should not be copyrighted, because they were intrinsically "social" creations; in this context, he wrote, "la propriet6 c'est le vol." See The Principles of Art (Oxford, 1938), 325-326.
"essence" of history) in this context is not a "relation" between independent historical actors and the historian. "Thought" defines all these individuals, and binds them together into a larger, non-temporal network. Every act (of thought, of understanding) "is more than a mere individual; it is something having a universal character" (IH 309). This is why Collingwood emphatically rejected biography as a possible subject of history. "Through this framework-the bodily life of man, with his childhood, maturity and senescence, his diseases and all the accidents of animal existence-the tides of thought, his own and others', flow crosswise, regardless of its structure, like sea-water through a stranded wreck" (IH 304). The historian is intercepting this perpetual flow of thought. The repetition that is re-enactment is only possible because each act of thought in the past was already a repetition of something which persists outside of all its concrete manifestations. Thought is something that "genuinely recurs" but to resurrect it through re-enactment, there must be a kind of switch into another "dimension." 53 Collingwood was working on this peculiar idea of individuality and identity early in his career. In his first book, Religion and Philosophy, for example, he suggested that truth could be shared and repeated in much the same way as "thought" in The Idea of History. At this earlier stage of his career, Collingwood was appealing to such idealist notions as the "absolute mind," a kind of Gentilian "concrete universal" that somehow replicated itself in the very process of history. 57 In Religion andPhilosophy, this identity was more explicitly linked to a divine source; the truth that appeared "under infinitely various aspects" was the truth of God as mediated by Christ's appearance.58 This theological, "idealist" attempt to reconcile the concrete and the "universal" in history is exactly what Collingwood is said to have abandoned in his later work, as he moved to a more radical historicist position, where there was no real universal binding the temporal fragments together.
This takes us to the heart of Collingwood's alleged "inconsistency," for in late works like An Essay on Metaphysics andAn Autobiography, he was supposedly saying rather clearly that there was no real historical continuity, no transcendent truths, only historically specific thought systems that had to be penetrated by recreating the past logic of question and answer. This process would lead to the fundamental concepts (the "absolute presuppositions") which grounded these systems and could not themselves be questioned. So even if Collingwood believed thought was repeatable, still he seemed to have given up on any idea of continuity, at least in the spiritual or metaphysical sense, in these texts. At the same time, Collingwood never at any point in his career really believed in the kind of metaphysical or transcendent identity which could be traced in abstraction, outside of the different embodiments it took on in history. His later emphasis on these historical differences is not necessarily a rejection of some underlying identity.59 Like Heidegger's turn in the 1930s, which saw him set aside questions concerning the ontology of Being in order to focus on its historical disclosures, Collingwood became interested in tracing the historical specificity of metaphysical questions, and he did not look for any ultimate "truths." Heidegger, like Collingwood, was claiming in the 1 930s that metaphysical questions were "historical through and through,"60 but historical did not imply historicism of any sort. This was because transcendence (however it was 57. Ibid., 289. conceived) was only revealed in its projection through history, an idea Walter Benjamin, for example, was also exploring in this period.61 The "historical" was still timeless, in that it was not limited by its specific place: there was always a sense of otherness, which could be grasped through the process of repetition, whether this meant probing the early origins of thinking for the "unthought" (Heidegger), blasting the historical object out of the past into the present (Benjamin), or re-enacting past thought in the present transformed context (Collingwood).
Collingwood's most "relativist" text was An Essay on Metaphysics, which introduced his theory of "absolute presuppositions," the inherently unverifiable foundations of any historical epoch's conceptual system. There was no "impartial standpoint" from which these foundations might be questioned.62 This text also suggests that these historically discontinuous forms of thought might conceal a hidden identity, as Collingwood discussed in some of his earlier work. In a highly suggestive comment on these groundless presuppositions of thought, the "absolute presuppositions" which seemed to have replaced any idea of "absolute mind," Collingwood -who was incidentally a perceptive reader of Freudnotes that "there is something a little uncanny about absolute presuppositions. They give people more than a touch of the feeling which Rudolf Otto called numinous terror."63 In cryptic allusions Collingwood seemed to have been suggesting that there was something behind these radically relative presuppositions.
Freud, in his 1919 essay "The 'Uncanny,"' quotes Schelling: "'Unheimlich' is the name for everything that ought to have remained. . . secret and hidden but has come to light."64 What is it about our absolute presuppositions that ought to remain secret? Perhaps it was not merely their groundlessness; as Freud argued, the uncanny is whatever reminds us of the inner compulsion to repeat.65 The uncanny, as Freud interpreted it, is an awareness that a manifest repetition reveals to us a more basic force that lies behind the particular repetitions. This more basic force, quite obviously, could never be known, or at least could never be directly observed. The "origin" could not be discovered, only continuously repeated.66 This same repetition structure is, interestingly enough, apparent in Otto's The Idea of the Holy, which Collingwood is alluding to here. Otto was seeking the essential origin of religious experience within the historically repeated (and varied) actual experiences of the sacred. The "numinous" is, for Otto, something invisible, preconceptual, brought to light only when it is articulated within a context of more concrete experiences and feelings.67 The terror we feel (the dread of the uncanny), is due to the powerful "non-present" presence of this sacred other.68 Collingwood, then, while limiting himself to the historical specificity of conceptual systems and their absolute presuppositions, probably allowed for the continuing, invisible presence of something within these historically discontinuous thoughts.69 As Freud and Otto also indicated, each in his own way, such a presence, by definition, cannot be abstracted from the particular context in which it has been embedded. As Collingwood wrote in Religion and Philosophy: "However much we try to remove all context from a thing, we can do no more than to invest it with a different context."70 "Truth" may be eternal, but it always takes on new forms as it is "clothed" in each particular historical context. As early as 1924, Collingwood was criticizing religion as a "formal error" for "mythologizing" these particular realities, translating the elusive presence of the divine into some kind of tangible representation.7" In this context, Collingwood's emphasis on historical discontinuity (and a reluctance to speak about ultimate truths or pure being) did not necessarily signal that he had adopted a "historicist" position in the Essay on Metaphysics. Yet, this invisible continuity was hardly apparent here either. This difficult question of the idea of a transcendent "non-present" presence in history was not unique to Collingwood but was part of a larger context of thought his ideas were refracting. Although there is no question Collingwood remained interested in overtly theological issues throughout his career,87 it is often assumed that his important thinking became increasingly secularized, as he placed more and more emphasis on the concrete forms of human activity and the highly contextualized nature of understanding. Yet, as I have suggested, his analysis of the historically concrete need not preclude an interest in transcendent identity. In Speculum Mentis Collingwood rejected "religion" as myth, but praised the religious insight as crucial for understanding human history, "because it liberates the soul . . . and leads from the things that are seen and temporal to the things that are unseen and eternal."88 This is the conceptual relation that can be followed in Collingwood's entire work: the relation between particular forms of human life and the "invisible" identity which preserves their continuity within these historical repetitions. However varied the context in which he was working, Collingwood's language was consistently and systematically instrumental: human action was seen to be performing a function by expressing something itself quite intangible. The artist, though working individually, is involved in a process of collaboration, in fact is the spokesman for the community, voicing the "secrets" it cannot itself express; the philosopher is described as the "organ" of the corporate consciousness, "called" to give expression to society's self-criticism; the church is the "living embodiment" of the Holy Spirit; the state is an "incarnation" of the sovereignty of political action; the historian is a "monad," a mirror in which the past is expressed in concentrated form; individuality is a "vehicle" of thought; tradition is a "force" that does not depend on conscious memory for its transmission; duty is an "atonement," a concrete, individual act that manifests the universal good in time.89 Each embodiment expresses something "invisible" which makes itself known only through these concrete expressions.
Collingwood wrote in The New Leviathan that the "birth of love is the act of limiting your demands: substituting for the quest of absolute satisfaction (the demand for omnipotence) the quest of many partial or incomplete satisfactions," while noting that Christianity is the "historical form" of a religion of unsatisfied love, "where the not-self on which the lover fixes his affections is not accessibly lodged in the world . . Collingwood's "historicism" was not necessarily inconsistent with his more transcendental, even mystical ideas, once we realize that the historically specific form is marked by the presence of something invisible, a force which has no tangible or even "abstract" structure. This concept is critical for understanding Collingwood's idea of history. Though it often goes unremarked, the opening historiographical narrative of The Idea of History includes the Christian conception of God as one of the "profound revolutions" in the study of history. In this conceptual revolution, individual actors themselves, not simply their actions, are considered vehicles of God's purpose, and therefore historically important; this concept, Collingwood goes on to explain, prepared the idea that all historical forms are transient entities which appear in history to serve a "definite function." Collingwood thought this was a major step, "because the recognition that the historical process creates its own vehicles, so that entities like Rome and England are not the presuppositions but the products [my italics] of that process, is the first step towards grasping the peculiar characteristics of history" (IH 48). This peculiarity, already encountered in a more elusive form in the re-enactment doctrine, is the idea that history is not a procession of discrete events to be reconstructed, but an ongoing series of transformations that express an invisible, transcendent force. If there was identity between different thoughts in history, there was also a certain kind of identity between other kinds of historical structures. This early Christian "revolution" in historical understanding, then, informs Collingwood's own "spiritual" analysis of civilization and progress. "In history," he wrote in a 1927 essay on historical cycles, "tout lasse, tout passe, tout casse; everything decays, and all movement is a movement away from something, a loss of something won, a withering, a death." Each new form of life heralds the death of a previous "vehicle." Every century, then, is always a "century of decline" in some way. As Collingwood writes, it may appear as if "European civilization, expressing itself as it does through these various organs, has been dying by inches for an unconscionable time." However, "this dying by inches is merely a synonym for life; when archer, or counterpoint, or the full-bottomed wig, shows symptoms of decay, that merely proves that the spirit of man is no longer in it; it is not here, it is risen; it has passed into another vehicle, and the mourners who bewail its death are all unaware that it is recreating itself in a new form beneath their very eyes."91 The continuity of history could not be discerned in the outward forms of life; it weaved its way through concrete cultural (and biological) realities.92 Working within history, the historian is obviously implicated in these cyclical crises of order, as new vehicles of history are emerging to replace empty and decaying ones. As Collingwood once commented, the questions to be answered by historians are not merely academic: "the historian does not raise problems at haphazard in this way; they raise themselves,"93 which meant that the historian must in one sense enter the forces of history. This was an idea developed in the lectures on history. Collingwood fissure. In fact, in this whole process of "solving" the mystery, the relationships previously hidden below the surface in the community -blackmail, illegitimacy, jealousy-relationships revealed by the work of the detective in the course of investigation (since they in fact contributed to the original crisis) cannot now be fully repressed, and therefore must be dealt with. The work, in other words, must continue in this new situation if a crisis is to be averted in the future. The history looks to the past to prepare for the future.
Collingwood always emphasized that historical work is not so much an attempt to observe passively the spectacle of past events of humanity, as it is an admittedly violent intervention into the past in order to perform a task in the present. While he wrote (in this section discussing the detective) that the problems history addresses are never quite so urgent as criminal disruptions, it is clear especially in later writings such as The New Leviathan that Collingwood believed history to be responsible for finding solutions to the critical problems faced by civilization. Nevertheless, this did not mean that historical research ought to be focused on "relevant" issues. Collingwood end of The Idea of History, had important political dimensions. There (commenting on two current crises) he wrote: "To solve the problem of war or of divorce is only possible by devising new institutions which shall recognize in full the moral claims recognized by the State or by monogamy, and shall satisfy these claims without leaving unsatisfied the further claims to which, in historical fact, the old institutions have given rise" (331). The solution was to reintroduce continuity in the midst of historical dissolution. When Collingwood wrote that we studied the past only "to see more clearly into the situation in which we are called upon to act,"99 the historian, like the detective, investigated the causes which led to the current problem that needed a solution, an essential task since the forces which led to this breakdown must be incorporated into the new solution. Yet this solution was not itself a historical one. As Collingwood said, historical work could never predict the future, even as it prepared its foundations. The decisive act was intrinsically ahistorical for Collingwood, despite the fact that this decision could only be responsibly made once the historical analysis of the precipitating event was worked out. Collingwood's theory of action is the context which relates history (as a dialectic of forms), historical practice, and, I will suggest, the spiritual idea of reenactment. Action, Collingwood explained, was not confined by the historical situation because, as we have seen, the tangible vehicles of history created by past action were inevitably imperfect and hence mortal incarnations. In an important sense, authentic action had to transcend the historical forms of life. In his first published essay, Collingwood remarked: "It is a duty, indeed it is the spring of all moral advance, to criticize current standards of morality and to ask whether this may not be a case where the current rule fails to apply." 100 Duty, discharged by an exceptional act, is a compelling force which breaks through the historical situation; it is an individual obligation that cannot be specified, or predicted, or subsumed under general laws, as Collingwood explained in his last book, The New Leviathan. In a draft version of this text he wrote that the "act is as unique as the agent whose duty it is." 101 That act has no precedent: "the goodness of a thing is the fact of it being chosen."'02 Duty (like the absolute presupposition, the historical imagination, or even political action) "is its own criterion"'103 It is of the moment, unverifiable, yet it is not for that reason merely expedient. "1( The act is in history but related to a higher obligation that calls each individual at a particular time to fufill his duty. However, this duty is not clearly indicated in advance. "All you get by considering what the word 'duty' means is a criterion by which it can be recognized and an assurance that there is only one thing to which it applies. You acquire no direct insight whereby that one thing can be unmistakably recognized. You are in no way protected against recognizing it wrong." 105 As Collingwood wrote: "All action begins with an immediate, indemonstrable, and irresistible feeling that we are filled and sustained by some power as yet unexpressed, which is to reveal itself through our action; and thus action . . . begins in faith and rests on faith. . ." 106 The act is not subsumed under laws or principles, but aims at expressing something "other." The invisibility of this other makes every act a genuine risk. This instrumental structure in Collingwood's thought underlies his conception of authentic action and duty. The individual is acting in time as an agent of some transcendent force. If the "goodness of an action is simply our decision to do it," then clearly our decisions must be linked to a higher moral order of some kind that would legitimize them. This structure is clearly evident in Collingwood's lectures on moral philosophy, where the ultimate authority is the divine. God, he wrote in 1926, is "not an object of man's thought but a life incarnate in man himself." The incarnation reveals to man how "he can become God, can be what he ought to be."9107 The moral life of man, then, is not an attempt to achieve some abstract standard, but in fact "the life of the divine spirit in man," an effort to identify and express this spirit adequately. 108 This is why our moral acts are so unique, so unprecedented, perhaps even "illegal." There is no timeless standard which can arbitrate individual acts. "The good will is no abstraction," Collingwood wrote, "it wills always something definite and individual; that is, its infinite essence realises itself through the existence of finite actions."109 These finite human actions therefore parallel divine action, which has no presuppositions, no determinations limiting its expression. "Hence all things are God not in the pantheistic sense that every empirical fact is as such equally divine, but in the sense that their empirical determinations are illusions which when removed give place to a true recognition of the fundamental divinity of them all, that is to say, their ultimate nature as pure activity." 110 Although at this point "history" seems to have retreated from the cosmic stage, in fact the concrete "empirical determinations," the finite historical actions, were crucially important for Collingwood. The divine would never be discovered in itself, unmediated.
Immersed in the empirical world, it was impossible for finite beings to strip away these "illusions" and reveal pure spirit. It was only through the tangible determinations that the mind gained any insight at all into this divine spirit.111 To explain how this insight was possible, Collingwood would describe how the "spirit" that gives life and continuity to history was in fact mediated by the individual mind. Spirit could not be observed as an object, since it incarnated itself within our own "thoughts." This complex relation, described in Collingwood's extremely dense notebooks on metaphysics from the 1930s, defined the way human action could be identified with a transcendent identity. Collingwood wrote that "the nisus which is in us in the form of conscious & free will is only one specialized form of a nisus operating throughout the universe, and we are so to speak the deputed agents of all existence, appointed for the purpose of realising spirit."112 So as Collingwood hinted in The Idea of History, the individual appears in history as a vehicle, the "agent" of a kind of "cosmic effort" to bring spirit into the world.113 Spirit could only be known to us as it was embodied in thought, localized in space and time, within the mind, though spirit was itself always trying to overcome all "outwardness" in its movement in history.
Collingwood (like Heidegger) warned against mythologizing pure Being, the God of pure activity, since it is by its very nature inaccessible to direct human perception. This is the reason why Collingwood focused on thought as the essence of historical understanding, for it is within the highest forms of thought, he believed, that the individual manifests the authentic relation to the divine. "Thought," he writes, "is thus the revelation to the mind of God in his transcendence, by the self-reproduction of God (without forfeiting this transcendence) in the mind."' 14 Thought in this temporal world is therefore always from the start a repetition: a repetition of God's will in a unique historical context. At 111. Collingwood here echoes Heidegger, who in Being and Time wrote: "If historiology, which itself arises from authentic historicality, reveals by repetition the Dasein which has-been-there and reveals it in its possibility, then historiology has already made manifest the 'universal' in the once-for-all. . . The theme of historiology is neither that which happened just once for all nor something universal which floats above it, but the possibility which has been tactically existent." Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, transl. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London, 1962), 446. We can compare here Karl Jaspers, who wrote: "Not the course of time and events that has no beginning and no end is historic, but the fulfilled time whose appearance rounds out and brings to the present what has intrinsic being by a relation to its transcendence. . . . When Leopold van Ranke, the historian, wrote that each time relates to God and is not just a step for times to come, he only seemed to be saying the same thing. We must add that this direct relation to God does not exist as an image and is thus not visible to the historical observer. Only its Existenz can be felt by another Existenz whose own historicity makes it approach the past in communication. the same time, the individual cannot simply work backwards to rediscover this divinity as it exists outside of any context: it only reveals itself in the particular realities, within the repetitions that make up the historical process. "In the movement of history . . . the starting point of that movement (God) must be enriching or unfolding itself, and every new step in that process must be a permanent addition to the divine nature. Now these steps are not abstractions, i.e. not mere events, deeds, historical occurrences (things that happen) they are spirits, individual minds." 115 This structure gives continuity to the historical process despite radical discontinuities in its formal organization. "Historical being triumphs over time in the sense that it becomes eternal: but it becomes eternal not in its actuality (as embodied form) for here, because embodied, it perishes: but in its ideality (as disembodied form)."'116 Re-enactment, it would seem to follow, rediscovers this greater history because it seeks out prior manifestations of spirit in actual thought. The historical structure Collingwood elaborates makes re-enactment the only path to self-understanding in the widest sense: the understanding of the individual as expression of the divine truth. Re-enactment is also an important component of decision, for the study of past incarnations prepares the actor for a new breakthrough of truth in the exceptional act. 17 As one note in the "symphony" of the infinite,118 each unique point in time, each decision, each repeatable thought, must be carefully preserved, as we move on toward the end of history. Violent abstraction could never reveal that infinite structure, nor was there a repeated pattern to be discerned somewhere. 
University of British Columbia

